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Abstract
The values of Nature are today ever more contested in attempts to reduce them to a narrow
economics calculus and financial metrics. The crisis of modernity is evident is that the concept of
Nature itself has been subject to post-modern deconstruction as archaic Romanticism while
simultaneously being made into a modernist capital form by economists, bankers and financiers. In
this paper we start by defining the meaning of Nature before moving to its values, the two being
inseparable. Nature is seen as combining three aspect: (i) being ‘other’ than human, (ii) a
biophysical structure and (iii) a quality which humans commonly and intuitively reference but
struggle to specify. When turning to the values of Nature we describe the three major meta-ethical
systems of Western philosophy—utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics. The contestation
especially between utilitarian and rights-based approaches is explored. The role of intrinsic value in
these systems is outlined. Modern mainstream economic valuation is then placed in context of the
forgoing discussion and critically reviewed as a misguided but hegemonic approach to valuing
Nature. The terrain of debate is laid out, briefly covering recent developments of rights to Nature
and Nature’s contribution to people. That Nature cannot be dismissed as a concept (something
attempted by some post-modernists and strong constructionists), but remains importantly contested
in terms of its values, is central to understanding the on-going social-ecological conflicts created by
Keywords: environmental values, Nature, ethics, utilitarianism, rights, virtue, incommensurability,
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1. Introduction 
The differential values of Nature become evident in the divisions between three positions: (i) 
respecting and leaving room for autonomous Nature (e.g. wilderness, rewilding, flourishing); (ii) 
using, but living in symbiotic relationships with, natural processes through traditional management 
(e.g. aboriginal fire ecology, or forms of organic agriculture and permaculture); and (iii) attempted 
domination over Nature in modernity via invasive technologies. The first and third positions can be 
seen as opposite extremes, where Nature is either dominant over or dominated by humans. The 
middle ground of the second position confronts rather than dismisses the tension between Nature 
and culture, human and non-human values. These three positions summarise society-Nature 
relations and the surrounding debates. They encapsulate something of the ongoing conflicts over the 
concept and values of Nature, and as such aid reflection on how we understand Nature. 
The first position may be seen as looking back to hunter-gatherer societies, a time before 
widespread human population expansion, and no or low impact land-use change. Here, Nature as 
provider is associated with lifestyles of sufficiency. Such ideas cross-over into the second position, 
as reflected in regarding indigenous cultures as being closer to Nature and natural processes. 
Similarly, the Romantic rural idyll is an idealised picture of humans living in harmony with Nature. 
Strong positions on value in Nature may be involved and in more recent times have been associated 
with deep ecology, and, often very loosely defined, concepts of ‘intrinsic value’ in non-human 
entities. Ideas of living from and within Nature, meetings needs, sufficiency and harmonious living 
are evident in modern environmental movements, such as degrowth.  
Counters to the idea of benevolent Nature as provider emphasise that life can be hard and 
Nature cruel. This appears as justification for increasing human management of natural processes 
(the third position). The struggle of ‘man’ against Nature is then employed to justify taming or 
eradicating wild animals, controlling the wilderness and making ‘wastelands’ productive. Such 
arguments have been cited by feminist literature as the imposition of a patriarchal social order. 
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Thus, the domination of Nature as female is connected to the exploitation and suppression of the 
feminine and women (Merchant 1980; Seager 1993). 
A somewhat different reaction against appeals to Nature, and naturalness, warns of the 
naturalisation of human social norms, practices and behaviours. More specifically, a range of social 
structures and mechanisms are seen as having been naturalised—elitists class relations, patriarchy, 
sexual oppression, heterosexuality, ethnic/racial discrimination, eating meat. Thus, imposed norms 
of a dominant social group may be legitimised as natural in a form of social Darwinism. Reaction 
against this may include criticising the imperialist imposition of concepts and value systems. An 
explicitly subjective and cultural basis for values then appears as an alternative, where claims to 
objectivity are dismissed, and may be replaced by conventionalism (i.e. values are merely social 
conventions), cultural relativism of knowledge and plural perspectives as equally valid. 
This counter to naturalisation is often presumed to be politically progressive on the 
assumption that it is politically tolerant. However, the move to cultural determination has also led to 
social constructionist arguments for the dissolution of Nature (Pollini 2013). These fail to account 
for the presence of Nature as a concept across time and space in human society and dismiss out-of-
hand non-human values. Opening the door to the legitimisation of all positions as equally valid 
undermines knowledge claims and undermines the ability to determine what (if anything) is wrong 
with modernity. As a result, the currently hegemonic modernist position of domination over Nature 
can actually gain support from this post-modernist critique of Nature. As noted, this goes to the 
opposite extreme from the first position. It proposes an anti non-human approach, and is typically 
allied with technological optimism, supporting economic growth as human progress, relying on 
anthropocentric, consequentialist arguments and utilitarian values. 
All three positions concern how Nature should be conceptualised, humans regard themselves, 
moral actions should be conducted and value conflicts addressed. Modernist human centred value 
positions envision man, or rather (patriarchal) men, as in control of everything, with the ability to 
choose what is to be valued and what not. Post-modernists similarly place humans at the centre by 
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dissolving Nature into the human and making it a social construct. Here Nature, if accepted to exist 
at all, is only a hybrid, an artefact, of human making. The zeitgeist phrase of the early 21st Century 
became ‘we are living in the Anthropocene’, a new geological era. This conflates global human 
impact with control while engaging in a Promethean discourse (Baskin 2015). Humans are 
described as both limited, facing catastrophe, and unlimited in their potentiality, i.e. the ability to 
make the world anew using geoengineering, genetic modification and the latest computing and 
communications technologies. The contrasting perspective is that modern human society has lost 
some basic understanding of the values of Nature that go beyond functionally fulfilling humans 
desires. In this view, humanity is out of control and subject to ultimate domination by the very 
structures it claims to have made irrelevant. 
The aim here is to explore the underlying values behind these positions. We start by clarifying 
what is understood by the concept ‘Nature’, and introducing the major value theories in Western 
philosophy (i.e. rights, utility and virtues). On this basis we explore the moral debate over how 
humans should value non-human reality and the entities of which it is constituted. Ethics and 
morality are taken as synonymous, and as rational means of guiding action. This refers to 
right/wrong/permissible behaviour with regard to basic values and a common concern across ethical 
theories for the alleviation of suffering and promotion of well-being (Pojman 1989). When 
considering the values of Nature, core concerns arise as to moral standing and considerability of 
non-humans, subjective vs objective values, plural values and incommensurability. In the 
penultimate section, we turn to the hegemonic policy discourse on environmental values under 
price-making market systems and neoliberalism. This involves the on-going struggle to counter, 
transform and move beyond the reduction of all values of Nature to a single metric, namely money. 
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2. Conceptualising Nature and Value 
What is Nature? 
Most fundamentally we must ask what is understood by the concept ‘Nature’, not least because of a 
post-modernist trend in denial of even its existence (Pollini 2013). Nature is generally taken as 
‘other’ than human. However, humans are simultaneously part of Nature, not least as physical, 
chemical and biological entities. Their interaction and impact on the natural world around them is 
self-evident. Confusion then arises as to what the concept means. Defining Nature also requires 
clarifying different uses of the term (see Soper 1995 especially Chapter 5). 
As an applied philosophical concept Nature stands in contrast to human (e.g. society, culture, 
artefact). It represents a means of understanding the ways in which humans and their activities are 
distinct. That something is ‘distinct from’ other entities should not be confused with being ‘separate 
from’ other things. For example, your hand is distinct from the rest of your body but connected to 
(not separate from) your body of which it is a part. Clearly, humans are part of a greater whole and 
part of Nature, but remain distinct entities. Much confusion results from equating the terms 
‘separate’ and ‘distinct’ and treating them as synonymous. The values of Nature are then about 
recognition of similarity and difference involving debates in environmental ethics over human-
Nature relations and the status of non-humans. 
A second use of the term Nature is ontological and concerns the fundamental aspects of 
reality that humans live within, that is the natural structures to which all are subject, metaphorically 
referred to as the laws of Nature. Science has enabled humanity to harness Nature’s causal powers 
while remaining subject to its law-like conditions and constraints. A confusion here is to equate 
advances in human understanding of the structure and functioning of Nature with ability to 
determine and dominate everything, with the ultimate aim of creating reality in man’s image. While 
humans impact on the bio-physical world, which is why there is an ecological crisis, they do not 
determine the structure, mechanisms and causal powers of Nature. Contra some commentators’ 
opinions, early pioneers of modern scientific approaches, such as Francis Bacon, understood that 
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Nature to be commanded must be obeyed (Book I Aphorism III Novum Organum 1620), meaning 
humans do not determine the rules of the game but have to learn them and play by the rules as set 
down by Nature. That there are real structures outside human control is exactly why ignoring 
biophysical limits results in ecosystems collapse, species going extinct, humans dying from 
pollutants and so on. Values here take the form of absolutes with associated concepts of thresholds, 
constraints and tipping points. 
A third meaning of Nature is that found in policy discussions, public debates and lay 
discourses. Here Nature is a quality of the otherness of the non-human. This can be seen as a 
dialectical concept with the human on one end and the natural on the other. In this context humans 
experience the outcome of their interactions and the changes this involves. What constitutes the 
‘natural’ is judged by the quality of the environment, the extent of biodiversity and the proximity of 
what is produced to its non-human state, e.g. regarding a wooden chair as more natural than a metal 
one. Nature is then commonly regarded as degraded through human actions, as empirically 
observed in events, e.g. the spread of domesticated animals, contamination of soil, air and water, 
manipulation of forests and extent of urbanisation. Here human intervention and management has 
qualitative impacts with aesthetic consequences, and creates forms of Nature that are actualised in 
landscapes and the occurrence, or lack, of species. This third meaning is the main preoccupation of 
policy discourses, conservation, environmental activism, Green politics and popular debate. Despite 
the policy relevance, there has been a lack of clarity as to how naturalness should be understood and 
its philosophical basis (for an informed clarification of the meaning see Deckers 2021). 
Nature, the non-human other, must then be understood as combining these different elements: 
an object in relation to humanity as subject which is distinct but not separate; a deep structure 
beyond human control that sets a range of limits (which humans ignore at their peril); and the 
quality of actualised interactions humans have in changing—creating, destroying, manipulating—
their surrounding environment and its constituent parts. How these aspects of Nature are 
comprehended is reflected in our formalisation and expression of values. 
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Environmental Values 
The various categories identified entail different understandings of what is at stake in defining the 
values of Nature. Philosophers and ethicists are concerned with comprehending the meaning of 
otherness and its moral implications for humans in their relationships with non-humans. Natural 
sciences seek to understand the structure and mechanisms of Nature to achieve specific 
consequences (e.g. to overcome gravity and fly using one set of mechanisms to counter another). 
Ecologists are also concerned with structure and functioning, not least because modernity has 
entailed dramatic ecosystem decline and collapse. Environmental politics and Green movements 
tend to operate at the contextually changing surface layer in which pandemics come and go, nuclear 
power stations melt down, climate change driven wild fires devastate large regions, and 
corporations pollute, extract resources and destroy habitat impacting humans and non-humans alike. 
Preoccupation with different aspects of Nature entails recognition of different values. 
That Nature is associated with different values for different people is unsurprising. As 
O’Neill, Holland and Light (2007) put it, humans both live from, in and with the environment. 
Living from Nature means most fundamentally that humans depend on functioning ecosystems and 
natural resources for their survival. Nature has value in being useful and is instrumental for human 
ends. However, humans are more than physical beings with physical needs. Humans live in Nature 
with others, both human and non-human, in specific places at specific times, and this entails values 
relating to a sense of place as known locations and set within a given historical and social context. 
We also live with Nature as one set of living organisms that can experience the wonder of life in a 
world that existed before hominids arose and is autonomous from humans (i.e. the ability of non-
humans to survive and flourish without us). Interpreting these different relationships has been 
contentious, involving challenges to traditional anthropocentric ethics with propositions of the need 
for a new approach, an environmental ethics. 
Ethics concerns how we decide what constitutes a good or bad action, valid principles for 
acting and their relationships. In Western philosophy there are three main ethical theories: 
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utilitarianism, deontology and virtues. The first is a specific form of consequentialism and 
associated with Jeremy Bentham’s philosophy of judging what is best on the basis of achieving the 
greatest good for the greatest number of morally considerable individuals. This has been adapted by 
mainstream economists into preference utilitarianism, where what individuals express as being 
preferred is deemed a choice that is equated to an expression of value. Under systems of 
utilitarianism there is intrinsic value in utility (which may be equated to well-being or welfare). 
Typically, utility is restricted to those consequences that affect humans, which may include their 
concerns over others, e.g. feeling bad about animal suffering. In theory, the consequences which 
affect the interests of non-humans could also be directly taken into account, regardless of whether 
those consequences have any effect on human well-being, by extending the community of morally 
considerable beings to non-humans. 
The second ethical system is derived from the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and regards an 
individual undertaking the right action as good in itself, so that conformity to principles of right 
action is intrinsically valuable. Deontology is typically associated with obligations to act in certain 
ways and rights-based approaches. In modernity this forms the moral basis for legal systems, 
although ethics are distinct from the law and operate without the need for legislation or judicial 
sanctions, i.e. the motivation is intrinsic to the individual. Some deontologists postulate the 
existence of moral absolutes, such as Kant’s categorical imperative or Rawls’ contractualism. Right 
action means a moral agent is one who, of their own volition (i.e. internal conscience), undertakes 
duties, fulfils obligations, follows moral codes of conduct or holds to ethical principles. 
The third ethical system derives from Aristotle and resurfaced as part of the doctrines of the 
Roman Catholic Church in medieval Europe, but has declined since the enlightenment as the other 
two ethical systems became dominant. Virtue ethicists focus on being over doing. It is who you are, 
which character traits you express through your actions, that is valued. The right actions express 
virtuous character traits. The theory is based in a specific understanding of the human being and of 
the purpose, or greater meaning, of life. Hence, for Aristotle, virtue was fundamentally linked to 
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human eudaimonia, often interpreted as flourishing, leading a good, happy and meaningful life. 
Moral absolutes and objective values in claims about the purpose of human life, or what constitutes 
the good life for humans, tend to be controversial, but can link to an ethics emphasising the 
importance of care, and relations to others, as in feminist theories. 
A key tension in environmental debates, explored below, is that between utilitarian and rights-
based approaches. However, the focus on these theories has also been criticised as Western 
ethnocentrism, that neglects alternatives (e.g., indigenous knowledge). That the three major value 
theories are limited in their ability to address the non-human world stimulated the development of 
environmental ethics. Thus, during the rise of the environmental movement, Routley (2009 [1973]) 
argued that a new—an environmental—ethics is necessary to address the failures of modernity with 
respect to human-Nature relations. Industrial modernity justified modes of thought that were 
anthropocentric, placing humans, primarily men, above all else, either in terms of attributing to 
them superior rights or prioritising consequences for humans. Traditional (pre-industrial) human 
societies regulated their co-existence with and behaviour toward the non-human world via 
conventions, rituals, norms, traditions, rules and taboos. Capitalism entailed the deliberate 
eradication of customs in the drive to create a commodified world of exchange values (Thompson 
1993). A new, environmental, ethics would therefore imply new modes of economic conduct and 
challenging modernity. 
Social structure, unlike the structure of Nature, can be changed, even if this tends to happen 
slowly over generations. That means, values, customs, practices and habits can change, However, 
such changes do not necessarily mean improvement, e.g. the rise of capitalism or fascism. There is 
then ongoing social transformation and conflict. 
Today, the phrase ‘natural value’ or ‘value of Nature’ is embedded in the dominant discourse 
of the political economy and the hegemonic economic thinking of the market place, where one thing 
is traded for another and everything has a price. Producing money numbers to represent ecosystems 
services, converting Nature into capital and generally placing ecological entities into a financial 
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discourse is how capitalism has addressed environmental problems. It has now become the 
dominant way of arguing in public policy debates even for the environmental movement itself. At 
the same time, empirical studies reveal that people hold plural values that conflict and values that 
are incommensurable. This is evident in actions such as refusals to trade, regardless of the price 
paid in compensation, and people risking, or sacrificing, their lives to protect places, landscapes and 
non-humans. The basis for such acts runs against the belief in purely anthropocentric values and in 
favour of an extension of moral considerability to non-human Nature. 
3. Moral Considerability of Non-Humans: Utility and Rights 
A key distinction made in Western value theory is between the valuing agent (for whom things are 
of value and whom evaluates) and the object/entity of valuation (the valuable, that which has 
value). This leads to some controversy over which entities are valuable in themselves (i.e. fonts of 
intrinsic value) as opposed to being solely valued in terms of their usefulness for achieving the ends 
of a valuing agent (i.e. instrumental and contributory value). A key element of dispute over the 
values of Nature concerns who has moral standing (i.e. counts as a moral agent) and who is morally 
considerable (i.e. has interests that moral agents must treat as important). The question then arises: 
Do only humans matter morally (anthropocentric perspective), or are there grounds for including 
non-human entities as moral agents or morally considerable (ecocentric perspective)? Indeed what 
is the basis for answering such a question and drawing equivalences? Western ethical theories then 
aim to identify what is valuable, those for whom value matters, grounds for attributing moral 
standing or considerability, and how moral agents should act as a result. 
Typically, humans are regarded as the moral agents, that is those ‘doing’ the valuing, or the 
subject for whom the valuable is desirable and influences their action. If value is given by the 
choices of the valuing agent then it is, in this sense, subjective. An example where this proves 
problematic is mainstream economists’ assumption that individuals give value to things they prefer 
and the value of those things is indicated by the strength of individual preferences. If people like 
pandas and not spiders then the former have value and latter do not (Spash 2008c). The valued and 
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the valuable are equated. Under such an approach, that valuing agents may get things wrong is 
inexplicable because what is preferred/chosen is by definition what is valuable/good. Accepting that 
valuing agents do get things wrong requires distinguishing what is valuable from what might 
(mistakenly) be held to have value. More generally, value may be regarded as something to be 
sought, e.g. seeking to live a good life or conducting the right acts. From this perspective value 
appears objective (i.e. constitutive of the good) and acts as a guide to moral action. 
The moral standing of humans might be regarded as value inherent in humans that is outside 
of how humans as subjects value. What is the value of a human qua human. Your value is not given 
to you by other humans or their values, nor by yourself. This may be expressed as humans having 
intrinsic value or being inherently of value because they can produce intrinsic value (i.e. utility, 
righteous action, virtue). However, the question of ‘what is the value of Nature?’ asks us to reflect 
upon how values might extend beyond humans and whether ‘others’ might have either moral 
standing (e.g. inherent value), or qualify for moral considerability. 
For example, wildlife conservationists have increasingly centred their concerns on entire 
species, the consequences of species extinction and the depletion of global biodiversity for 
ecosystems and ultimately the planet. There is then a distinction required between whether the 
health of ecosystems, or the planet (e.g. personified as Gaia), is to be taken as of value in itself, or 
because this would adversely affect human quality of life. Similarly, the view that extinction of 
species (or death of individual animals) is bad in itself, regardless of the consequences, contrast 
with the view that the negativity of such an outcome derives from its consequences—judged in 
relation to violating an ethical (e.g. deontological, utilitarian, virtue) principle. The range of 
possible consequences and principles to be invoked will depend upon the entities that are deemed to 
enter into direct moral consideration and the moral standing attributed to them. 
Consider some endangered species of elephant. The extinction of each individual elephant 
may be held to be of moral concern, or only the extinction of the entire species, or only the impact 
that the loss of elephants (individually or as a whole) has on the ecosystem and its functions. Our 
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answer to the question tends to depend on a prior one: whether the elephants matter only insofar as 
their survival affects the interests of humans, or whether the elephants themselves are held to have 
morally considerable interests. That is, are humans the only morally considerable creatures or are 
non-humans (e.g. elephants) also morally considerable? The ecosystem services literature makes the 
implicit assumption that what matters is provision of value for human ends and nothing else. The 
role of elephants, or anything else, can be replaced if the value is maintained. 
Norman Myers, in his book The Sinking Ark, argues that whether a species should be saved 
(i.e. scarce resources should be used to save them) depends on their relative usefulness. He rejects 
saving species “come what may”. The issue is whose ends (amongst those with moral standing) are 
served by the conservation of species, and how does saving a species enhance the long-term welfare 
of humans (assumed to be the only entities with moral standing). This in turn implies prioritising 
species in order of potential for extinction. Such an approach is instrumental, consequential and 
anthropocentric. 
If only humans are morally considerable, then the argument arises that specific species should 
be preserved only to the extent that a desire for this is reflected in human preferences. This has led 
environmental economists to argue for optimal extinction as an economically valid approach (e.g. 
Swanson 1994). Traditionally wildlife conservation has sought to preserve key iconic species at the 
expense of others, e.g. lions, tigers, elephants, rhinos, pandas. This vertebrate-centred ethics limits 
the morally considerable community to a small number of higher mammals. Yet, the basis for such 
a restricted approach is challenged by recognising the moral considerability of all those creatures 
who, in some meaningful sense, have the capacity to suffer. 
Historically the most influential version of consequentialism has been utilitarianism. 
Utilitarianism is egalitarian in the sense that it considers equally the interests of all morally 
considerable beings affected by an action, e.g. the abilities of all beings to suffer. As Bentham 
(1823 [1789]: 235-236) mentioned in a footnote: “The day may come when the rest of the animal 
creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the 
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hand of tyranny. […] the question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but Can they suffer?” 
(emphasis original). However, Bentham did not pursue the matter. Indeed his own utilitarian 
approach aimed for the greatest good for the greatest number of humans, and so allowed the 
sacrifice of the individual (and their well-being) for the greater good. This approach became 
encapsulated in the idea that the best action is that which generates the greatest net welfare for 
humans. However, recognition of animal suffering later led others to campaign to prevent cruelty to 
animals and protect animal welfare. 
Such a welfarist approach can be equated to using drugs to prevent pain rather than stopping 
the causes of pain and suffering. It can be seen as operative in the provision of minimal animal 
husbandry conditions imposed on industrial farming practices based on the grounds that animal 
suffering is then avoided. Such is also the logic of humane killing. This exemplifies how moral 
considerability is different from having moral standing (i.e. in this case animal welfare versus 
humans as the moral agents). Human experimentation on animals can also be justified on the basis 
that either they feel no pain (i.e. drugs may be used) or that the greater good is served (i.e. human’s 
will benefit more than the animal suffers). Welfare is often equated with value as ‘utility’, but 
pinning down the meaning of such terms is far from straight forward. Hence utility can cover a 
variety of positives, including obtaining preference satisfaction, pleasure (hedonism) and happiness, 
or avoiding negatives such as frustration, pain, suffering and loss. Animal welfare as a form of 
utilitarian argument for avoiding negatives contrasts with recognising the ability of, and allowing 
for, ‘others’ (i.e. non-humans) to flourish and live meaningful lives in their own terms. 
As already noted, mainstream economists have adopted a very specific form of utilitarian 
ethics where they define utility as preference satisfaction, or more precisely value is defined 
(objectively) as utility that requires assessing welfare of humans based on their preference 
satisfaction (McShane 2017). In his book Practical Ethics Peter Singer presents a utilitarian defence 
of the value of animals that evaluates consequences in terms of the extent to which they satisfy the 
preferences of the agents granted moral considerability. Following Bentham’s suggestion, this is 
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defined to be all creatures with the capacity to suffer, raising the evaluative problem of assessing 
preference satisfaction of non-humans, and so not such a practical ethics after all. Economists have 
struggled to even make sense of assessing human preferences as indicators of value (Spash 2008c). 
The main alternative to valuing Nature in utilitarian terms has been the Kantian deontological 
approach. A common example of the extension of rights is the ‘abolishment’ of slavery, where non-
white humans were upgraded, from treatment as non-human animals with no moral considerability, 
to inclusion amongst those with moral standing (i.e. moral agents). Although, in practice, racial 
discrimination was never removed (as the Black Lives Matter movement made evident) and the 
slave trade has continued illegally. Crucially, under deontology, rights-bearers possess equal 
standing and rights apply equally. The classic problem is what to do where conflicts arise between 
rights. The extension of moral standing to ‘others’ by the environmental movement has mostly been 
conducted in terms of attributing animals rights, but in recent times has also appeared in more 
general terms. 
An example is the ‘Rights of Nature’ that came to prominence due to national legislation 
giving legal and sometimes constitutional recognition to Nature as a subject with inalienable rights. 
Legal provisions now exist in Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Mexico, New Zealand, and 
the USA (Kauffman and Martin 2018). In particular, the struggle of indigenous communities for 
protection of territory became associated with making Nature a subject and giving it standing in law 
(i.e. supposed protection via legal sanction not ethical motivation). This is a recognition of interests 
that tends to relate to humans rather than non-humans. As such ‘Rights of nature’ appears more of a 
political tool rather than a moral philosophical struggle to recognise Nature’s value as found in 
indigenous culture (Tanasescu 2015). Institutional differences arise in defining the Nature that bears 
rights, the rights recognised, who can speak for Nature, whether anyone is responsible for 
protecting Nature’s rights and, if so, how. In Ecuador, such rights have been mixed with nationalist 
feelings underpinning a critique of neoliberalism, and aspirations for legal protection amongst 
indigenous communities and the decolonization of society (Espinosa 2019). However, Nature’s 
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Rights have paradoxically also been used to promote mega-mining projects in Ecuador—claiming 
Nature is protected, will be restored, can be compensated—revealing their limitations under 
neoliberal governance and institutions (Valladares and Boelens 2019). In Brazil such rights also 
seem to have been ineffective; destruction of the Amazon has accelerated, rather than declined, 
under the Bolsonaro government. 
4. Going Beyond Nature’s Value Under Neoliberal Public Policy 
The rise of neoliberalism has seen environmental policy become increasingly dominated by 
economic approaches and a discourse claiming that making the value of Nature to humans visible in 
monetary terms will mean it is ‘taken into account’, or more precisely and quite literally, the 
accounts of firms, banks and nations. The claim is that if Nature has value then it should be 
empirically measureable. Pavan Sukdev, head of a major United Nations (UN) backed project on 
the economics of ecosystems and biodiversity (TEEB 2010), and later president of the World 
Wildlife Fund, has claimed that if something cannot be measured it cannot be managed. More 
recently, the same logic has been pushed forwarded by The Dasgupta Review, which converts 
everything, both human and non-human, into forms of financial capital (Dasgupta 2021). 
Beside the very specific form value then takes, the destruction of the environment is reduced 
to an information problem. An implicit claim is that demonstrating the monetary benefits will 
incentivise —inherently self-interested materialistic—humans to take better care of Nature, and that 
includes politicians and business men and women. Ecologists and conservationist have joined with 
economists to classify and enumerate ecosystem services that can then be ‘valued’. The value of 
Nature becomes a matter of subjective human preference, like choosing a flavour of ice cream: if 
you like it then it has value and if you don’t it has none. Protecting Nature then makes the leap of 
logic to giving Nature a price in the market place, leading to the rhetoric of ‘getting the prices 
right’. The consequences of such market values has long been evident in capitalist modernity, where 
the primary aim is to commensurate and trade. Prices and monetary values are purely means of 
facilitating market exchange and creating opportunities for financial returns, and certainly have 
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nothing to do with protecting Nature. For example, biodiversity offsets are justified on the basis of 
an economic logic where ecosystems and species can be treated as commensurable across time and 
space and so traded. The result is not protection of biodiversity but rather its destruction justified by 
the financial value of ‘development’ projects (Spash 2015; Spash and Hache 2021). 
Framing the value of Nature in this way employs a range of contested assumptions. First, the 
utilitarian ethics employed is restricted to what is useful for humans (i.e. anthropocentric). Second, 
the object of value (i.e. Nature) is assumed to be a clear, discrete and definable entity (like a 
physical commodity) and something that humans can express preferences about. Third, the market 
is erroneously assumed to automatically protect that which is given a price. Fourth, demonstrating 
Nature has a money value is meant to create political action, but there is no theory of politics in the 
approach nor any specification as to why this should be so. Fifth, the approach assumes there is an 
information deficit that can be filled by monetary values. In contrast, actors in competitive markets 
are engaged in a structure that rewards deliberate cost-shifting in full awareness of the destruction 
and harm involved. 
Despite these failings, this approach to ‘valuing Nature’ has become a core aspect of public 
policy discourses on the environment. Environmental economists have expanded their categories of 
value along with their methods of valuation. Moving from values reflected in actual markets, 
designated as ‘use values’, they started in the 1970s hypothesising option, bequest and existence 
values, as some form of non-use value, but still within a preference utilitarian philosophy. Some 
equated existence values with ‘intrinsic values’ in an attempt to claim all forms of value had now 
been ‘captured’ in their ‘total value’ approach. While intrinsic value has several interpretations, 
being given value by another agent contradicts these, and its being an inherent quality of an entity, 
which have nothing to do with preferences. There is also no relationship between existence of an 
entity and the preference value claims of economists (McShane 2017). 
Amongst the tools developed, the contingent valuation method (CVM) became popular and a 
rare source of primary data in economics. However, CVM has been dogged by controversy (e.g. 
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valuation studies undertaken after the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989), and its claim to produce 
monetary values, that are definitive of species and ecosystems worth, lack credibility, both in 
practice and theory. Concerns include: treatment of protest bid and bid exclusion, use of 
‘willingness to pay’ rather than ‘willingness to accept’ compensation for damages, treating 
respondents holding rights-based beliefs as preference utilitarians and values simply reflecting a 
scale of psychological attitudes (Ryan and Spash 2011; Spash 2008a). There are wider issues in 
economic valuation as well, including: discounting, assuming marginal analysis is relevant, 
assuming reversibility, failing to account for preference construction and the role of information 
(Gowdy and Olsen 1994; Spash 2002). Economists using such techniques produce numbers 
appearing precise and objective, when they are, in fact, precisely wrong in what they claim to 
measure. 
These issues have not dissuaded environmentalists from advocating use of the resulting 
numbers on the basis that money is the ‘language’ of policy (Smith 2017). The move has been 
supported by the focus on market-based instruments (so called ‘solutions’) under neoliberalism, that 
advocates rational choice which is reduced to weighing-up cost and benefits. Conventional 
economic cost-benefit analysis can then be employed using extended methods to appraise 
individuals’ revealed and stated preferences. What goes unnoticed, or unremarked, is how Nature is 
being conceptualised as an exchangeable item that can be treated as if a commodity, i.e. made 
commensurable and traded. Ecosystems’ functions become ‘ecosystem services’ and natural 
structure becomes ‘natural capital’. Very particular forms of values are then expressed and 
expressible via the associated institutional arrangements. Unwittingly, under the guise of being 
pragmatic, the advocates of equating Nature’s value to a monetary equivalent deny the existence of 
value pluralism and incommensurability, and downplay the role of scientific knowledge in defining 
key attributes of Nature (Spash 2009; 2013). Ecologists and conservation biologists have not been 
immune to changing their concepts and language to conform to the mainstream environmental 
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economic approach, and as a result have undermined their own traditional research (Spash and 
Aslaksen 2012). 
Ecologists have long tried to understand interactions and interdependencies within natural 
ecosystems, including how ecosystems function, and how different species are linked together and 
depend upon each other as living beings in community. Like others in the web of life, humans 
interact with and are dependent upon other species and the functioning of ecosystems. Societies and 
economies are embedded in biological, chemical and physical structures upon which they are 
dependent. This does not mean that all human actions are determined by these structures, but they 
are certainly constrained by them. Properly functioning natural systems are essential to human 
survival and the quality of these systems is a determining factor in human well-being. That means 
Nature has instrumental value and there are consequences from its destruction. 
However, this does not mean the concept of intrinsic value can be dismissed as irrelevant. As 
was noted, when introducing the three meta-ethical systems of Western philosophy, forms of 
intrinsic value exist as a fundamental concept in any value system and cannot be captured by being 
redefined as use value, as attempted in mainstream economics. Humans can be regarded as having 
(or creating) intrinsic value in economic theory, because this theory assumes all value derives from 
humans, but humans themselves do not derive their own value from this system. In other words, 
humans have an unexplained moral standing for mainstream economists, which is why human 
preferences count and those of other animals do not.  While the concept of intrinsic value has often 
been used loosely and interpreted differently by different authors (McShane 2017; O'Neill 1992), it 
addresses an important understanding of what constitutes environmental values (McShane 2007). 
Empirical research also shows that people do actually relate to Nature in terms of intrinsic value 
(Butler and Acott 2007). 
That there are plural values (intrinsic, instrumental, consequential) taking different forms 
(subjective, objective/absolute), and posing fundamental incommensurabilties, has remained a 
central problem for those seeking simple means of taking Nature into account, as well as those 
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trying to include all values in some summary form. There are then questions over the relative merits 
of different value articulating institutions (Vatn 2005 see Chapter 12). Considering the values of 
Nature reveals the inability of the typically individualised preference approaches to address the 
values that are expressed in group participation and deliberation (Spash 2008b). As outlined above, 
environmental cost-benefit analysis has become overextended and divorced from its theoretical 
basis. More than that, it could never address plural incommensurable values because it claims a 
monistic value and universal commensurability. Attempts to bring the plural values of Nature into 
decision-making processes then point towards inclusive, deliberative and participatory methods. 
While facing their own limitations and problems, these methods offer the potential for improving 
the democratic legitimacy of the environmental decision-making process. 
Concerns over the restrictive perspectives on the values of Nature imposed in public policy 
have also been related to the exclusion of indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLC). IPLCs 
challenge the hegemonic discourse of market value and economic growth, and represent non-
Western forms of non-instrumental reasoning. Along these lines, the concept of ‘relational values’ 
has recently been adopted by the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services (IPBES) under an approach called Nature’s Contribution to People (Díaz, et al. 
2018). Relational values are supposed to fill a perceived gap between instrumental and intrinsic 
value. They have been described as building from interpersonal relations and involving reasons for 
loving and caring that create meaningfulness. 
Neuteleers (2020) identifies four characteristics as constitutive of relational values: mutual 
creation, identity dependence, motivation dependence and a shared final end that is ‘good in itself’. 
However, the idea of being good/valuable in itself would seem to be a form of intrinsic value, even 
though the idea was to go beyond this in some way. An important additional aspect appears to be 
the role of identifying with the object of value in what appears to be a self-constituting form of 
psychological relationship, i.e. feeling connected, feeling something is a part of yourself. However, 
as Neuteleers notes, the self-motivation to act in a certain way towards an object is not a 
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duty/obligation (i.e. deontology). Overall, there seems to be a close proximity between relational 
values and the Aristotelian concepts of eudaemonism, virtues, flourishing and the good life. At the 
same time, the relational values literature can be criticised for using vague and broad definitions of 
eudaemonic values, being unclear about the relationship between Nature and the good life, and 
between eudaemonic values and other values, and, finally, for risking reducing eudaemonic value to 
instrumental value. Still, even though relational values seem to suffer from vagueness, complex 
definitions and potentially having confusing overlaps with instrumental and intrinsic values, they 
are an important expression of the discontent with current polices and of the ongoing struggle to 
(conceptually) capture the complex relationships humans have with Nature. 
5. Conclusion 
Attempts to remove the concept of Nature, because it is blamed for having naturalised unethical, 
exploitative and discriminatory social behaviour, have been misdirected and failed to account for 
fundamental aspects of the concept, in terms of both biophysical structures beyond human control 
and what is ‘other’ than human in the universe. That attempts are made repeatedly, by economists 
and others (Dasgupta 2021; Pearce and Moran 1994; TEEB 2010; UNEP 2019), to make Nature 
into an economic commodity form, value it as capital and/or make it into a hybrid artefact, is an 
indication of the conflict existing today between (past, present and post) modernity, capital 
accumulating economies and the non-human world. The non-human is then to be squeezed out if it 
cannot be made to conform to the dominant existing anthropocentric value systems. Where then is 
the place for non-humans and their inter-relationships? The attempt to value nothing but that which 
matters for humans appears to miss out a major aspect of reality (Vetlesen 2015). That Nature has 
multiple values, which are not easily defined, challenges those seeking simple solutions to complex 
social ecological crises. 
The on-going mass extinction of species, human induced climate change and the myriad of 
other ecological problems are hardly surprising outcomes when living in a system that treats Nature 
as either contributing a luxury consumer product, an optional extra in the market place, or a 
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producer input cost, something that can be bought and paid for, a price worth paying for 
‘development’ and profits. That the values of Nature have been central to human society, and 
remain so, is undeniable. That they are contested intensely today, more than ever, is a sign of their 
importance. 
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